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Abstract
Adversarial examples of deep neural networks are re-
ceiving ever increasing attention because they help in un-
derstanding and reducing the sensitivity to their input. This
is natural given the increasing applications of deep neural
networks in our everyday lives. When white-box attacks are
almost always successful, it is typically only the distortion
of the perturbations that matters in their evaluation.
In this work, we argue that speed is important as well,
especially when considering that fast attacks are required
by adversarial training. Given more time, iterative methods
can always find better solutions. We investigate this speed-
distortion trade-off in some depth and introduce a new at-
tack called boundary projection (BP) that improves upon
existing methods by a large margin. Our key idea is that the
classification boundary is a manifold in the image space:
we therefore quickly reach the boundary and then optimize
distortion on this manifold.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples [32] are small, usually impercep-
tible perturbations of images or other data [7] that can ar-
bitrarily modify a classifier’s prediction. They have been
extended to other tasks like object detection or semantic
segmentation [37], and image retrieval [21, 33]. They are
typically generated in a white-box setting, where the at-
tacker has full access to the classifier model and uses gra-
dient signals through the model to optimize for the pertur-
bation. They are becoming increasingly important because
they reveal the sensitivity of neural networks to their in-
put [30, 11, 2] including trivial cases [3, 10] and they easily
transfer between different models [24, 35].
Adversarial examples are typically evaluated by prob-
ability of success and distortion. In many cases, white-
box attacks have probability of success near one, then only
distortion matters, as a (weak) measure of imperceptibil-
ity and also of the ease with which adversarial samples
can be detected. The speed of an attack is less frequently
discussed. The fast single-step FGSM attack [13] pro-
duces high-distortion examples where adversarial patterns
can easily be recognized. At the other extreme, the Carlini
& Wagner (C&W) attack [6], considered state of the art,
is notoriously expensive. Decoupling direction and norm
(DDN) [28] has recently shown impressive progress in dis-
tortion but mostly in speed.
Speed becomes more important when considering adver-
sarial training [13]. This defense, where adversarial exam-
ples are used for training, was in fact introduced in the same
work as FGSM. The latter remains the most common choice
for generating those examples because of its speed. How-
ever, unless a powerful iterative attack is used [23], adver-
sarial training is easily broken [34].
In this work, we investigate in more depth the speed-
distortion trade-off in the regime of probability of success
near one. We observe that iterative attacks often oscillate
across the classification boundary, taking long time to sta-
bilize. We introduce a new attack that rather walks along
the boundary. As a result, we improve the state of the art in
distortion while keeping iterations at a minimum.
Illustrating the attacks. To better understand how our at-
tack works, we illustrate it qualitatively against a number
of existing attacks in Fig. 1. On this toy 2d classification
problem, the class boundary and the path followed by the
optimizer starting at input x can be easily visualized.
PGD2, an `2 version of I-FGSM [18], a.k.a. PGD [23],
is controlled by a distortion target  and eventually follows
a path on a ball of radius  centered at x (cf . Fig. 1(a)).
Section 4 shows that varying  is an effective yet expen-
sive strategy. It can only be done for a limited set of values
so that the optimal distortion target per image may only be
found by luck.
C&W [6] depends on a parameter λ that controls the
balance between distortion and classification loss. A low
value may lead to failure. A higher value may indeed reach
the optimal perturbation, but with oscillations across the
class boundary (cf . Fig. 1(b)). Therefore, an expensive line
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Figure 1. Adversarial attacks on a binary classifier in two dimensions. The two class regions are shown in red and blue. Contours indicate
class probabilities. The objective is to find a point in the red (adversarial) region that is at the minimal distance to input x. Gray (black)
paths correspond to low (high) distortion target  for PGD2 [18] (a, in green) or parameter λ for C&W [6] (b). The simulation is only
meant to illustrate basic properties of the methods. In particular, it does not include Adam optimizer [16] for C&W.
search over λ is performed internally.
DDN [28] (cf . Fig. 1(c)) increases or decreases distor-
tion on the fly depending on success and at the same time
pointing towards the gradient direction. It arrives quickly
near the optimal perturbation but still suffers from oscilla-
tions across the boundary.
On the contrary, boundary projection (BP), introduced
in this work (cf . Fig. 1(d)), cares more about quickly reach-
ing the boundary, not necessarily near the optimal solution,
and then walks along the boundary, staying mostly in the
adversarial (red) region. It therefore makes steady progress
towards the solution rather than going back and forth.
Our attack. Our key idea is that, once we reach the ad-
versarial region near the boundary, the problem becomes
optimization on a manifold [1]: in particular, minimization
of the `2 distortion on a level set of the classification loss.
When in the adversarial region, we project the distortion
gradient on the tangent space of this manifold. We do this
simply by targeting a particular reduction of the distortion
while moving orthogonally to the gradient of the classifica-
tion loss.
Our benchmark. Quantization is another major issue in
this literature. Most papers implicitly assume that the out-
put of a white-box attack is a matrix where pixel values are
real numbers in [0, 1]. [28] is one of the rare works where
the output is a quantized. We agree with this definition of
the problem. Indeed, an adversarial image is above all an
image. The goal of an attacker is to publish images delud-
ing the classifier (for instance on the web), and publishing
implies compliance with pixels encoded in bytes.
Contributions. We make the following contributions. To
our knowledge, we are the first to
1. Study optimization on the manifold of the classifica-
tion boundary for an adversarial attack, providing an
analysis under a number of constraints, such as stay-
ing on the tangent space of the manifold and reaching
a distortion target.
2. Investigate theoretically and experimentally the quan-
tization impact on the perturbation.
3. Achieve at the same speed as I-FGSM [18] (20 itera-
tions) and under the constraint of a quantization, less
distortion than state-of-the-art attacks including DDN,
which needs 100 iterations on ImageNet.
2. Problem, background and related work
2.1. Problem formulation
Preliminaries. Let X := {0,∆, . . . , 1 − ∆, 1}n with
∆ := 1/(L − 1) denote the set of grayscale images of n
pixels quantized to L levels, and let Xˆ := [0, 1]n denote the
corresponding real-valued images. An image of more than
one color channels is treated independently per channel; in
this case n stands for the product of pixels and channels.
A classifier f : Xˆ → Rk maps an image x to a vector
f(x) ∈ Rc+ representing probabilities per class over c given
classes. The parameters of the classifier are not shown here
because they remain fixed in this work. The classifier pre-
diction pi : Xˆ → [c] := {1, . . . , c} maps x to the class label
having the maximum probability:
pi(x) := arg max
k∈[c]
f(x)k. (1)
If a true label t ∈ [c] is known, the prediction is correct if
pi(x) = t.
Problem. Let x ∈ X be a given image with known true la-
bel t. An adversarial example y ∈ X is an image such that
the distortion ‖x− y‖ is small and the probability f(y)t is
also small. This problem takes two forms:
1. Target distortion, minimal probability:
min
y∈X
f(y)t (2)
subject to ‖x− y‖ ≤ , (3)
where  is a given distortion target. The performance
is then measured by the probability of success Psuc :=
P(pi(y) 6= t) as a function of .
2. Target success, minimal distortion:
min
y∈X
‖x− y‖ (4)
subject to pi(y) 6= t. (5)
The performance is then measured by the expected dis-
tortion D := E(‖x− y‖).
This work focuses on the second form, but we present
example attacks of both forms in section 2.2.
Untargeted attack. The constraint pi(y) 6= t in (5) is re-
ferred to as an untargeted attack, meaning that y is misclas-
sified regardless of the actual prediction. As an alternative,
a targeted attack requires that the prediction pi(y) = t′ is a
target label t′ 6= t. We focus on the former.
Loss function. We focus on a white-box attack in this
work. Such an attack is specific to f , which is public. In
this setting, attacks typically rely on exploiting the gradient
of some loss function, using variants of gradient descent.
A classification loss is defined on the probability vector
p = f(y) with respect to the true label t. For an untargeted
attack, this is typically the negative of cross-entropy
`(p, t) := log pt. (6)
We should warn that, while the cross-entropy is appropriate
for bringing examples into the region of class t during clas-
sifier training, its negative (6) is in general not appropriate
for pulling them out during an attack. This is because this
function is mostly flat in the class region. A common so-
lution is to normalize the gradient of ` [13, 28], assuming
it is nonzero. We consider more options in this work. A
targeted attack on the other hand may use − log pt′ , which
works fine because it brings examples into class t′ region.
Distortion. This work focuses on the 2-norm ‖·‖ as a mea-
sure of distortion. Alternatives like 1-norm and ∞-norm
are also common [13, 6]. It is known that none is appropri-
ate for measuring the imperceptibility of adversarial attacks,
while more sophisticated measures like structural similarity
(SSIM) [36] are limited too [29]. Measuring imperceptibil-
ity is arguably as difficult as classification itself.
Integral constraint. The constraint y ∈ X in (3) and (5)
is typically relaxed to y ∈ Xˆ during optimization. Some
works conclude the attack by loosely quantizing the optimal
solution onto X , typically by truncation towards zero. To
our knowledge, DDN [28] is the only work to do rounding
instead, and at the end of each iteration. Quantization is be-
coming an important issue in adversarial examples because
the distortions achieved in recent papers are so small that
quantization impacts a lot the perturbations. Appendix A
provides a more in-depth study of the impact of the quanti-
zation.
2.2. Attacks
Target Distortion. Given a distortion target , the fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM) [13] performs a single step in
the opposite direction of the (element-wise) sign of the loss
gradient with∞-norm ,
y := x−  sign∇x`(f(x), t). (7)
This is the fastest method for problem (2)-(3). In the
same work adversarial training was introduced, this method
quickly generates adversarial examples for training. How-
ever, the perturbations are usually high-distortion and visi-
ble. The iterative-FGSM (I-FGSM) [18] initializes y0 := x
and then iterates
yi+1 := projB∞[x;](yi − α sign∇x`(f(yi), t)), (8)
where projection1 is element-wise to the closed ∞-norm
ball B∞[x; ] of radius  and center x, and also to Xˆ
(element-wise clipping to interval [0, 1]). This method is
also known as basic iterative method (BIM) [27] and as pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD) [23]. We refer to as PGD2 a
2-norm version replacing (8) with
yi+1 := projB2[x;](yi − αη(∇x`(f(yi), t))), (9)
where η(x) := x/ ‖x‖ denotes 2-normalization, and pro-
jection is to the closed 2-norm ball B2[x; ] of radius  and
center x, followed again by element-wise clipping to [0, 1].
Although this method is part of Cleverhans library [27], it
is not published according to our knowledge.
Target Success. This family of attacks is typically more
expensive. [32] propose a Lagrangian formulation of prob-
lem (4)-(5), minimizing the cost function
J(y, c) := ‖x− y‖2 + λ`(f(y), t), (10)
where variable λ is a Lagrange multiplier for (5). They
carry out this optimization by box-constrained L-BFGS.
The attack of [6], denoted by C&W in the sequel, per-
tains to this approach. A change of variable eliminates the
box constraint, replacing y ∈ X by σ(w), where w ∈ Rn
and σ is the element-wise sigmoid function. The classifica-
tion loss encourages the logit log pt to be less than any other
log pk for k 6= t by at least margin m ≥ 0,
`m(p, t) := [log pt −max
k 6=t
log pk +m]+, (11)
where [·]+ denotes the positive part. This function is simi-
lar to the multi-class SVM loss by Crammer and Singer [8],
where m = 1, and, apart from the margin, it is a hard ver-
sion of negative cross-entropy `where softmax is producing
the classifier probabilities. It does not have the problem of
being flat in the region of class t. The C&W attack uses the
Adam optimizer [16] to minimize the cost function
J(w, λ) := ‖σ(w)− x‖2 + λ`m(f(σ(w)), t). (12)
for w ∈ Rn. When the margin is reached, loss `m vanishes
and the distortion term pulls σ(w) back towards x, causing
oscillations around the margin. This is repeated for different
λ2 by line search, which is expensive.
1We define projA(u) := argminv∈A ‖u− v‖.
2Referred to as c in [6].
Decoupling direction and norm (DDN) [28] is iterating
similarly to PGD2 (9),
yi+1 := projS[x;ρi](yi − αη(∇x`(f(yi), t))), (13)
but projection is to the sphere S[x; ρi] of radius ρi and cen-
ter x, and the radius is adapted to the current distortion: It
is set to ρi = (1 − γ)‖yi − x‖ if yi is adversarial and to
(1 + γ)‖yi − x‖ otherwise, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a param-
eter. Another major difference is that each iteration is con-
cluded by a projection onto X (rather than Xˆ ) by element-
wise clipping to [0, 1] and rounding.
Discussion. Optimizing around the class boundary is not a
new idea. All of the above attacks do so in order to mini-
mize distortion; implicitly, even attacks targeting distortion
like PGD2 do so, if the minimum parameter  is sought
(cf . Figure 1(a) and Section 4.2). Even black-box attacks
do so [5], without having access to the gradient function.
The difference of our attack is that our updates are along
the class boundary, i.e., in a direction normal to the gra-
dient. DeepFool [25] is a popular attack targeting success,
that is not optimizing for distortion and not following a path
around the class boundary.
2.3. Other related work
Optimization on manifolds. In the context of deep learn-
ing, stochastic gradient descent on Riemanian manifolds
has been studied, e.g. RSGD [4] and RSVRG [38]. It is
usually applied to manifolds whose geometry is known in
analytic form, for instance Grassmann manifolds [4], op-
timizing orthogonal matrices on Stiefel manifolds [14] or
embedding trees on the Poincaré ball [26].
In most cases, the motivation is to optimize a very com-
plex function (e.g. a classification loss) on a well-studied
manifold, e.g. matrix manifold [1]. On the contrary, we are
optimizing a very simple quadratic function (the distortion)
on a complex manifold not known in analytic form, i.e. a
level set of the classification loss.
3. Method
Our attack is an iterative process with a fixed number K
of iterations. Stage 1 aims at quickly producing an adversar-
ial image, whereas Stage 2 is a refinement phase decreasing
distortion. The key property of our method is that while
in the adversarial region during refinement, it tries to walk
along the classification boundary by projecting the distor-
tion gradient onto the tangent hyperplane of the boundary.
Hence we call it boundary projection (BP).
3.1. Stage 1
This stage begins at y0 = x and iteratively updates in the
direction of the gradient of the loss function as summarized
in Algorithm 1. The gradient is normalized and then scaled
by two parameters: a fixed parameter α that is large s.t.,
with high probability, Stage 1 returns an adversarial image
yi ∈ Xˆ ; and a parameter γi that is increasing linearly with
iteration i as follows
γi := γmin +
i
K + 1
(γmax − γmin), (14)
such that updates are slow at the beginning to keep dis-
tortion low, then faster until the attack succeeds, where
γmin ∈ (0, γmax) and γmax = 1. Clipping is element-wise.
Algorithm 1 Stage 1
Input: x: original image to be attacked
Input: t: true label (untargeted)
Output: y with pi(y) 6= t or failure, iteration i
1: Initialize y0 ← x, i← 0
2: while (pi(yi) = t) ∧ (i < K) do
3: gˆ← η(∇x`(f(yi), t))
4: yi+1 ← clip[0,1](yi − αγigˆ)
5: i← i+ 1
6: end while
3.2. Stage 2
Once Stage 1 has succeeded, Stage 2 continues by con-
sidering two cases: if yi is adversarial, case OUT aims at
minimizing distortion while staying in the adversarial re-
gion. Otherwise, case IN aims at decreasing the loss while
controlling the distortion. Both work with a first order ap-
proximation of the loss around yi:
`(f(yi + u), t) ≈ `(f(yi), t) + u>g, (15)
where g = ∇x`(f(yi), t). The perturbation at iteration i is
δi := yi−x. Stage 2 is summarized in Algorithm 2. Cases
OUT and IN illustrated in Fig. 2 are explained below.
Case OUT takes as input yi outside class t region, i.e.
pi(yi) 6= t. We set a target distortion  = γi ‖δi‖ <
‖δi‖ (14) such that updates decelerate to convergence once
the attack has already succeeded. We then solve the follow-
ing problem:
z := arg min
v∈V
‖v − yi‖ (16)
V := arg min
v∈P
|‖v − x‖ − | , (17)
where P := {v ∈ Rn : 〈v − yi, gˆ〉 = 0} is the tangent
hyperplane of the level set of the loss at yi, normal to gˆ.
The constraint v ∈ P aims at maintaining the value of the
loss, up to the first order. On this hyperplane, V is the set of
points having distortion close to .
Consider the projection v? := x + rgˆ of x onto that
hyperplane, where r := 〈δi, gˆ〉. If r ≥ , then V = {v?},
and the solution of (16) is trivially z = v?. Note that v? =
Algorithm 2 Stage 2
Input: t: true label (untargeted), i current iteration number
Input: yi: current adversarial image, : target distortion
Output: yK
1: while i < K do
2: δi ← yi − x . perturbation
3: gˆ← η(∇x`(f(yi), t)) . direction
4: r ← 〈δi, gˆ〉
5: if pi(yi) 6= t then . OUT
6: ← γi ‖δi‖ . target distortion
7: v? ← x + rgˆ
8: z← v? + η(yi − v?)
√
[2 − r2]+
9: yi+1 ← QOUT(z,yi)
10: else . IN
11: ← ‖δi‖ /γi . target distortion
12: z← yi −
(
r +
√
2 − ‖δi‖2 + r2
)
gˆ
13: yi+1 ← QIN(z,yi)
14: end if
15: i← i+ 1
16: end while
yi if δi, gˆ are collinear. If r < , there is an infinity of
solutions to (17). We pick the one closest to yi:
z = v? + η(yi − v?)
√
2 − r2. (18)
This case is illustrated in Fig. 2(a), where V is a circle that
is the intersection of sphere S[x; ] and P ; then z is the
intersection of V and the line through yi and v?.
Directly quantizing vector z onto X by Q(·), the
component-wise rounding, modifies its norm (see App. A).
This pulls down our effort to control the distortion. Instead,
the process QOUT(z,yi) in line 9 looks for the scale β of the
perturbation to be applied s.t. ‖Q(yi + β(z−yi))‖ = ‖z‖.
This is done with a simple line search over β.
Case IN takes as input yi inside class t region, i.e. pi(yi) =
t. We set a target distortion  = ‖δi‖ /γi > ‖δi‖ (14) such
that updates decelerate as in Case OUT. We then solve the
problem:
z := arg min
v∈S[x;]
〈v, gˆ〉 , (19)
i.e., find the point z at the intersection of sphere S[x; ] and
the ray through yi in the direction opposite of g as shown
in Fig. 2(b). The solution is simple:
z = yi −
(
r +
√
2 − ‖δi‖2 + r2
)
gˆ, (20)
Vector z moves away from yi along direction −gˆ by a step
size so to reach S[x, ]. Case IN is not guaranteed to suc-
ceed, but invoking it means that Stage 1 has succeeded.
Again a direct rounding jeopardizes the norm of the up-
date z−yi. Especially, quantization likely results inQ(z) =
x
yig
V

z
P
v? x
yi
g

z
(a) (b)
Figure 2. Refinement stage of BP. Case OUT when |V | > 1 (a);
case IN (b). See text for details.
Q(yi) if ‖z − yi‖ < βmin = 0.1 (see App. A). Instead of
a line search as in method OUT, line 13 just makes sure that
this event will not happen: QIN(z,yi) = Q(yi+β(z−yi))
with β = max(1, βmin/‖z− yi‖).
4. Experiments
In this section we compare our method boundary pro-
jection (BP) to the attacks presented in Sect. 2, namely:
FGSM [13], I-FGSM [18], PGD2 (9), C&W [6], and
DDN [28]. This benchmark is carried out on three well-
known datasets, with a different neural network for each.
4.1. Datasets, networks, and parameters
For the target distortion attacks i.e. FGSM, I-FGSM and
PGD2, we test a set of  and calculate Psuc and D accord-
ing to our evaluation protocol (cf . section 4.2). For C&W,
we test several parameter settings and pick up the optimum
setting as specified below. For DDN, the parameter settings
are the default [28], i.e. 0 = 1.0 and γ = 0.05. Below we
specify different networks and parameters for each dataset.
MNIST [20]. We use is a simple network with three con-
volutional layers and one fully connected layer achieving
accuracy 0.99, referred to as C4. The first convolutional
layer has 64 features, kernel of size 8 and stride 2; the sec-
ond has 128 features, kernel 6 and stride 2; the third has also
128 features, but kernel 5 and stride 1. It uses LeakyRelu
activation [22].
Parameters. We set α = 0.08 for I-FGSM and α = /2
for PGD2. For C&W: for 5 × 20 iterations3, learning rate
η = 0.5 and initial constant λ = 1.0; for 1× 100 iterations,
η = 0.1 and λ = 10.0.
CIFAR10 [17]. We use a simple CNN network with nine
convolutional layers, two max-pooling layers, ending in
global average pooling and a fully connected layer. Its ac-
curacy is 0.927. Batch normalization [15] is applied after
every convolutional layer. It also uses LeakyRelu.
3C&W performs line search on λ: “5 × 20” means 5 values of λ, 20
iterations for each.
Parameters. We set α = 0.08 for I-FGSM and α = /2
for PGD2. For C&W: for 5 × 20 iterations, learning rate
η = 0.1 and initial constant λ = 0.1; for 1× 100 iterations,
η = 0.01, and λ = 1.0.
ImageNet [19] comprises 1,000 images from ImageNet [9].
We use InceptionV3 [31] whose accuracy is 0.96.
Parameters. We set α = 0.08 for I-FGSM and α = 3
for PGD2. For C&W: for 5 × 20 iterations, learning rate
η = 0.01 and initial constant λ = 20; for 1×100 iterations,
η = 0.01 and λ = 1.0.
4.2. Evaluation protocol
We evaluate an attack by its runtime, two global statis-
tics Psuc and D, and by an operating characteristic curve
D → P(D) measuring distortion vs. probability of success
as described below.
Since we focus on the speed-distortion trade-off, we
measure the required time for all attacks. For the iterative
attacks, the complexity of one iteration is largely dominated
by the computation of the gradient, which requires one for-
ward and one backward pass through the network. It is thus
fair to gauge their complexity by this number, referred to as
iterations or ‘# Grads’. Indeed, the actual timings of 100 it-
erations for I-FGSM, PGD2, C&W, DDN and BP are 1.08,
1.36, 1.53, 1.46 and 1.17 s/image on average respectively
on ImageNet, using Tensorflow, Cleverhans implementa-
tion for I-FGSM and C&W, and authors’ implementation
for DDN.
We measure distortion when the adversarial images are
quantized by rounding each element to the nearest element
in X . This makes sense since adversarial images are meant
to be stored or communicated as images rather than real-
valued matrices. DDN and BP adversarial images are al-
ready quantized. For reference, we report distortion without
quantization in Appendix B.3.
Given a test set ofN ′ images, we only consider its subset
X of N images that are classified correctly without attack.
The accuracy of the classifier is N/N ′. Let Xsuc be the
subset of X with Nsuc := |Xsuc| where the attack succeeds
and let D(x) := ‖x− y‖ be the distortion for image x ∈
Xsuc. The global statistics are the success probability Psuc
and conditional average distortion D
Psuc :=
Nsuc
N
, D :=
1
Nsuc
∑
x∈Xsuc
D(x). (21)
Here,D is conditioned on success. Indeed, distortion makes
no sense for a failure.
We define the operating characteristic of a given attack
over the setX as the function P : [0, Dmax]→ [0, 1], where
Dmax := maxx∈Xsuc D(x). Given D ∈ [0, Dmax], P(D) is
the probability of success subject to distortion being upper
# Grads Psuc D
Rounding in the end 20 1.00 1.44100 1.00 1.43
Rounding at each iteration 20 1.00 0.41100 1.00 0.32
Rounding withQIN ,QOUT
20 1.00 0.35
100 1.00 0.28
Table 1. Success probability Psuc and average distortion D of our
method BP on ImageNet with different quantization strategies.
bounded by D,
P(D) :=
1
N
|{x ∈ Xsuc : D(x) ≤ D}|. (22)
This function increases from P(0) = 0 to P(Dmax) = Psuc.
We sample one intermediate point: Pupp := P(Dupp) is the
success rate within a distortion upper bounded by Dupp ∈
(0, Dmax).
It is difficult to define a fair comparison of distortion tar-
geting attacks to success targeting attacks (see section 2.2).
For the first family, we run a given attack several times over
the test set with different target distortion . The attack suc-
ceeds on image x ∈ X if it succeeds on at least one of
the runs, and the distortion D(x) is the minimum distortion
over all successful runs. All statistics are then evaluated as
above.
4.3. Quantization
Before addressing the benchmark, Table 1 shows the crit-
ical role of quantization in our method BP. Since this attack
is iterative and works with continuous vectors, one may
quantize only at the end of the process, or at the end of
each iteration. Another option is to anticipate the detrimen-
tal action of quantizing by adapting the length of each step
accordingly, as done by QIN(·) and QOUT(·) in Algorithm 2.
The experimental results show that the key is to quantize
often so to let the next iterations compensate. Anticipating
and adapting gives a substantial extra improvement.
4.4. Attack evaluation
Table 2 summarizes the global statistics of the bench-
mark. Fig. 3 offers a more detailed view per dataset with
operating characteristic plots.
In terms of average distortion, all iterative attacks per-
form much better than the single-step FGSM. The perfor-
mances of C&W are on par with those of I-FGSM, which
is unexpected for this more elaborated attack design. The
reason is that C&W is put under stress in our benchmark.
It usually requires a bigger number of iterations to deliver
high quality images. Note that it is possible to avoid the line
search on parameter λ as shown in row 1×100. However, it
requires a fine tuning so that this single value works over all
the images of the dataset. This is not possible for ImageNet.
DDN and our method BP are clearly ahead of the bench-
mark. DDN yields lower distortion on MNIST at fewer iter-
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Attack # Grads Psuc D Pupp Psuc D Pupp Psuc D Pupp
FGSM 1 0.99 5.80 0.00 0.95 5.65 0.00 0.88 9.18 0.00
I-FGSM 20 1.00 3.29 0.17 1.00 3.54 0.00 1.00 4.90 0.00100 1.00 3.23 0.18 1.00 3.53 0.00 1.00 4.90 0.00
PGD2
20 1.00 1.80 0.63 1.00 0.66 0.76 0.63 3.63 0.00
100 1.00 1.74 0.66 1.00 0.60 0.84 1.00 1.85 0.00
C&W 5×20 1.00 1.94 0.56 0.99 0.56 0.81 1.00 1.70 0.001×100 0.98 1.90 0.57 0.87 0.38 0.76 0.97 2.57 0.00
DDN 20 0.82 1.40 0.70 1.00 0.63 0.74 0.99 1.18 0.05100 1.00 1.41 0.87 1.00 0.21 0.98 1.00 0.43 0.97
BP (this work) 20 1.00 1.45 0.86 0.97 0.49 0.87 1.00 0.35 0.96100 1.00 1.37 0.91 0.97 0.30 0.97 1.00 0.28 1.00
Table 2. Success probability Psuc and average distortion D with quantization. Pupp is the success rate under distortion budget Dupp = 2 for
MNIST, 0.7 for CIFAR10, and 1 for ImageNet.
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Figure 3. Operating characteristics on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet. The number of iterations is 5×20 for C&W and 100 for I-FGSM,
PGD2, DDN and our BP.
ations, but its probability of success is not satisfying. DDN
is indeed better than BP only on CIFAR10 at 100 iterations.
Fig. 3 reveals that the two attacks have similar operating
characteristic on all datasets but this is because it refers to
100 iterations.
In terms of success rate, FGSM fails on MNIST; on CI-
FAR10, I-FGSM and PGD2 fail as well; finally on Ima-
geNet, C&W fails too. DDN also fails on ImageNet at 20
iterations.
Increasing the number of iterations helps but not at the
same rate for all the attacks. For instance, going from 20
to 100 iterations is waste of time for I-FGSM while it is
essential for decreasing the distortion of DDN or making
PGD2 efficient on ImageNet. Most importantly, our attack
BP brings a dramatic improvement in the speed vs. dis-
tortion trade-off. Just within 20 iterations, the distortion
achieved on ImageNet is very low compared to the others.
Appendix B.2 shows the speed vs. distortion trade-off in
more detail.
Statistics of BP stages are as follows: On CIFAR-10 and
MNIST, Stage 1 takes 7 iterations on average. On Ima-
geNet, Stage 1 takes on average 3 iterations out of 20, or
8 iterations out of 100.
Appendix C shows examples of images along with cor-
responding adversarial examples and perturbations for dif-
ferent methods.
4.5. Defense evaluation with adversarial training
We also test under adversarial training [13]. The net-
work is re-trained with a dataset composed of the original
training set and the corresponding adversarial images. This
training is special: at the end of each epoch, the network is
updated and fixed, then the adversarial images for this new
update are forged by some reference attack, and the next
epoch starts with this new set. This is tractable only if the
reference attack is fast. We use it with FGSM as the refer-
ence attack.
It is more interesting to study DDN and BP as alterna-
tives to FGSM: at 20 iterations, they are fast enough to play
the role of the reference attack in adversarial training. In
this case, we follow the training process suggested by [28]:
the model is first trained on clean examples, then fine-tuned
for 30 iterations with adversarial examples. As shown in
Table 3, DDN and BP perform equally better than FGSM
on CIFAR10, in terms of either average distortion or suc-
cess rate. Among the reliable attacks (i.e. whose Psuc is
close to 1), the worst attack now requires a distortion three
times larger than the distortion of the worst attack with-
out defense. In the same way, on MNIST, the distortion
of the worst case attack doubles going from 1.37 (baseline)
to 2.73 (BP defense). In most cases, BP is a better defense
than DDN, forcing the attacker to have 20% more distor-
tion. Note that for a given defense, the strongest attack is
almost always BP.
5. Discussion
The main idea of BP is to travel on the manifold defined
by the class boundary while seeking to minimize distortion.
This travel is operated by the refinement stage, which al-
MNIST CIFAR10
Attack→ PGD2 DDN BP PGD2 DDN BP
↓ Defense 20 100 20 100 20 100 20 100 20 100 20 100
baseline
Psuc 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97
D 1.80 1.74 1.40 1.41 1.45 1.37 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.21 0.49 0.30
Pupp 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.76 0.84 0.74 0.98 0.87 0.97
FGSM
Psuc 1.00 1.00 0.51 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
D 1.92 1.85 1.28 1.60 1.92 1.58 0.68 0.62 0.59 0.24 0.67 0.24
Pupp 0.48 0.53 0.44 0.72 0.53 0.73 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.98 0.72 0.99
DDN
Psuc 0.99 1.00 0.29 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
D 3.03 2.89 1.68 2.38 2.69 2.27 0.95 0.94 0.77 0.71 0.75 0.68
Pupp 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.58
BP
Psuc 0.94 0.96 0.36 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
D 3.14 3.12 1.65 2.81 2.98 2.73 0.96 0.94 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.69
Pupp 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.59
Table 3. Success probability Psuc, average distortion D, and success rate Pupp under adversarial training defense with I-FGSM, DDN, or
BP (with 20 iterations) as the reference attack. For the MNIST, the model is trained from scratch. For CIFAR10, it is fine-tuned for 30
extra epochs as suggested by [28] with DDN and BP, and trained from scratch for 200 epochs with FGSM. Pupp measured at distortion
Dupp = 2 for MNIST, and 0.7 for CIFAR10.
ternates on both sides of the boundary, but attempts to stay
mostly in the adversarial region. Referring to section 2.1,
BP is in effect doing for the target success problem what
PGD2 is doing for the target distortion problem: BP mini-
mizes distortion on the class boundary manifold (a level set
of the classification loss), while PGD2 minimizes the clas-
sification loss on a sphere (a level set of the distortion).
BP also takes into account the detrimental effect of quan-
tization. By doing so, the amplitude of the perturbation is
controlled from one iteration to another. The main advan-
tage of our attack is the small number of iterations required
to achieve both reliability (probability of success close to
one) and high quality (low average distortion).
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A. Predicting distortion after quantization
This appendix aims at predicting the norm of the update
after quantization, assuming that it is independent from the
computation of the perturbation. Iteration i starts with a
quantized image yi ∈ X , adds update u ∈ Rn, and then
quantizes s.t. yi+1 = Q(yi + u). Quantization is done by
rounding with ∆ := 1/(L− 1) the quantization step. Pixel
j is quantized to
yi+1,j = yi,j + ej (23)
for some ej ∈ ∆Z such that uj ∈ (ej − ∆/2, ej + ∆/2].
Border effects where yi,j + ej /∈ X are neglected.
We now take a statistical point of view where the update
is modelled by a random vector U uniformly distributed
over the hypersphere of radius ρ. That parameter ρ is the
norm of the perturbation before quantization. This yields
random quantization values, denoted by Ej ∈ ∆Z for pixel
j. The distortion between the two images is
D2 =
n∑
j=1
(yi+1,j − yi,j)2 =
n∑
j=1
E2j . (24)
A common approach in source coding theory is the ad-
ditive noise model for quantization error in the high resolu-
tion regime [12]. It states that Ej = Uj + Qj where Qj ∈
(−∆/2,∆/2] is the quantization error. When ρ ∆, then
Qj becomes uniformly distributed (s.t. E(Qj) = 0 and
E(Q2j ) = ∆
2/12) and independent of Uj (s.t. E(UjQj) =
E(Uj)E(Qj) = 0). Under these assumptions, Eq. 24 sim-
plifies in expectation to:
E(D2) = E
 n∑
j=1
U2j +Q
2
j + 2UjQj
 = ρ2 + n∆2
12
.
(25)
This shows that quantization increases the distortion on ex-
pectation.
Yet, this simple analysis is wrong outside the high reso-
lution regime, and we need to be more careful. The expec-
tation of a sum is always the sum of the expectations, what-
ever the dependence between the summands: E(D2) =∑n
j=1E(E
2
j ) = nE(E
2
j ) with
E(E2j ) = ∆
2
L−1∑
`=0
`2P(|Ej | = `∆). (26)
We need the distribution of Ej to compute the expected
distortion after quantizarion. This random variableEj takes
a value depending on the scalar product Sj := U>cj ,
where cj is the j-th canonical vector. This scalar product
lies in [−ρ, ρ], so thatP(Ej ≥ `∆) = 0 if `∆−∆/2 > ‖ρ‖.
Otherwise, Ej ≥ `∆ when |Sj | ≥ `∆ − ∆/2, which
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Figure 4.
√
E(D2) as a function of ρ for n = 3 ∗ 2992 and ∆ =
1/255.
happens when U lies inside the dual hypercone of axis cj
and semi-angle θ(`) = arccos(s(`)) with s(`) := (2` −
1)∆/2‖ρ‖. The probability of this event is equal to the ra-
tio of the solid angles of this dual hypercone and the full
space Rn. This quantity can be expressed via the incom-
plete regularized beta function I , and approximately equals
2Φ(
√
ns(`)/2) for large n. In the end, ∀` ∈ {0, . . . , L−1},
P(|Ej | ≥ `∆) =

1, if ` = 0
1− Is(`)2(1/2, (n− 1)/2), if 0 ≤ s(`) ≤ 1
0, otherwise
Computing E(D2) is now possible because P(|Ej | =
`∆) = P(|Ej | ≥ `∆) − P(|Ej | ≥ (` + 1)∆). This ex-
pected distortion after quantization depends on ∆, n, and ρ
the norm of the perturbation before quantization. Figure 4
shows that quantization reduces the distortion outside the
high resolution regime. Indeed,
√
E(D2) is close to 0 for
ρ < 0.1 when n = 3 ∗ 2992 (i.e. ImageNet). When the
update has a small norm ρ, quantization is likely to kill it,
yi+1 = yi, and we waste one iteration. On the contrary,√
E(D2) converges to
√
ρ2 + n∆2/12 for large ρ (i.e. in
the high resolution regime). Note that the ratio of the dis-
tortions before and after quantization ρ/
√
E(D2) quickly
converges to 1 for large ρ.
B. Additional experiments
B.1. Parameter Study
There are two parameters in BP: α and γmin. Both de-
termine the step size of stage 1, while γmin also determines
the step size of stage 2. We consider 4 values for α, i.e.
1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 values for γmin, i.e. 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9. For
each pair of values, we evaluate BP with 20 iterations on a
validation set, which we define as a random subset sampled
of the training set: 10000 images for MNIST and CIFAR10,
and 1000 images for ImageNet. As shown in Fig. 5, success
probability is close to one in all cases, while average distor-
tion is in general stable up to γmin = 0.8. We choose α = 2
and γmin = 0.7 for all experiments.
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Figure 5. Success probability Psuc and average distortion D for
different values of parametersα and γmin of BP with 20 iterations.
B.2. Speed vs. distortion trade-off
Figure 6(a) is a graphical view of some results reported
in Table 2 with more choices of number of iterations be-
tween 20 and 100, and only for ImageNet where our perfor-
mance gain is the most significant. Just within 20 iterations,
its distortion D is already so much lower than that of other
attacks, that its decrease (-20% at 100 iterations) is not visi-
ble in Fig. 6. On the contrary, more iterations are useless for
I-FGSM, and PGD2 can achieve low distortion only with a
number of iterations bigger than 50. Figure 6(b) confirms
that the probability of success is close to 1 for both DDN
and BP for the numbers of iterations considered.
B.3. Attack evaluation without quantization
Table 4 is the equivalent of Table 2 but without the inte-
gral constraint: the attack is free to output any real matrix
provided that the pixel values all belong to [0, 1]. When
the distortion is large, there is almost no difference. The
model of App. A explains this: We are in the high resolution
regime and the extra term in Eq. 25 is negligible compared
to the perturbation distortion before quantization. This is
especially true when the number of samples n is small (i.e.
MNIST, and to some extend, CIFAR-10).
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Figure 6. (a) Average distortion vs. number of iterations for I-
FGSM, PGD2, C&W, DDN and our method BP on ImageNet.
I-FGSM is not improving with iterations because it is constrained
by . (b) Corresponding probability of success vs. number of iter-
ations for PGD2 and BP.
When an attack delivers low distortion on average with
real matrices, the quantization may lower the probability
of success. This is especially true with the iterative attacks
finding adversarial examples just nearby the border between
the two classes. Quantization jeopardizes this point and
sometimes brings it back in the true class region. More im-
portantly, the impact of the quantization on the distortion is
no longer negligible. This is clearly visible when compar-
ing Table 4 and Table 2 for DDN and BP over ImageNet.
Similarly, Fig. 7 is the equivalent of Fig. 3 without the
integral constraint. By comparing the two figures, it can
be seen that PGD2 and C&W, but also DDN and BP, are
improving on ImageNet by having significantly lower dis-
tortion. This agrees with measurements of success rate in
Table 4, where PGD2 and C&W are not failing as they do
in Table 2 with quantization. Our BP is still the strongest
attack over all datasets.
B.4. Attack evaluation on robust models
Table 5 is similar to Table 2 but is evaluating attacks on
robust models. In particular, on MNIST and CIFAR10, we
use the same models as described in Section 4.1, which we
adversarially train according to [23]. On ImageNet, we use
off-the shelf4 InceptionV3 obtained by ensemble adversar-
ial training on four models [34].
In general, DDN and BP outperform all other attacks in
terms of either average distortionD or success rate Pupp. On
ImageNet in particular, all other attacks have significantly
higher distortion and fail in terms of success rate. DDN
and BP have similar performance on CIFAR10. On MNIST,
4https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/
master/research/adv_imagenet_models
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Figure 7. Operating characteristics on MNIST, CIFAR10 and Im-
ageNet without quantization. The number of iterations is 5 × 20
for C&W and 100 for I-FGSM, PGD2, DDN and our BP.
DDN fails in terms of probability of success at 20 iterations,
while at 100 iterations BP is superior. On ImageNet, DDN
has significantly greater distortion than BP and fails in terms
of success rate at 20 iterations, while at 100 iterations BP
still has lower distortion.
Fig. 8 is showing a more detailed view of operating char-
acteristics, similarly to Fig. 3 for models trained on natural
images. We can see that BP is still ahead of the competition.
It is close to DDN, but this is because Fig. 8 refers to 100
iterations. The two attacks outperform all others by a large
margin.
C. Adversarial image examples
Fig. 9 shows the worst-case ImageNet example for
BP along with the adversarial examples generated by all
methods and the corresponding normalized perturbations.
FGSM has the highest distortion over all methods in this
example and BP the lowest. DDN has the highest∞-norm
distortion. Observe that for no method is the perturbation
visible, although this is a worst-case example.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
Attack # Grads Psuc D Pupp Psuc D Pupp Psuc D Pupp
FGSM 1 0.99 5.81 0.00 0.97 4.78 0.00 0.85 3.02 0.00
I-FGSM 20 1.00 3.22 0.27 1.00 3.54 0.00 1.00 4.47 0.00100 1.00 3.16 0.29 1.00 3.53 0.00 1.00 4.47 0.00
PGD2
20 1.00 1.76 0.63 1.00 0.51 0.77 0.64 3.94 0.36
100 1.00 1.70 0.66 1.00 0.43 0.85 0.95 1.11 0.61
C&W 5×20 1.00 1.93 0.56 1.00 0.56 0.81 1.00 1.37 0.231×100 1.00 1.89 0.57 0.97 0.38 0.84 1.00 1.87 0.06
DDN 20 0.82 1.39 0.70 1.00 0.62 0.74 1.00 0.76 0.95100 1.00 1.41 0.87 1.00 0.20 0.98 1.00 0.28 0.99
BP (this work) 20 1.00 1.41 0.86 0.97 0.33 0.87 1.00 0.20 1.00100 1.00 1.35 0.91 0.97 0.18 0.97 1.00 0.16 1.00
Table 4. Success probability Psuc and average distortion D without quantization. Pupp measured at Dupp = 2 for MNIST, 0.7 for CIFAR10,
and 1 for ImageNet.
MNIST CIFAR10 ImageNet
[23] [23] [34]
Attack # Grads Psuc D Pupp Psuc D Pupp Psuc D Pupp
FGSM 1 0.48 5.69 0.05 0.98 6.21 0.00 0.44 2.98 0.00
I-FGSM 20 1.00 4.99 0.08 1.00 4.53 0.00 1.00 4.92 0.00100 1.00 4.99 0.08 1.00 4.56 0.00 1.00 4.93 0.00
PGD2
20 0.99 2.76 0.19 1.00 1.03 0.41 0.76 2.14 0.00
100 1.00 2.68 0.20 1.00 1.02 0.41 0.98 1.59 0.00
C&W 5×20 0.99 2.75 0.27 0.98 1.41 0.22 0.98 2.85 0.001×100 0.94 2.22 0.34 0.60 0.77 0.27 0.97 2.41 0.00
DDN 20 0.43 1.61 0.32 0.97 0.92 0.41 0.99 1.10 0.23100 1.00 2.12 0.48 1.00 0.87 0.42 1.00 0.34 0.98
BP (this work) 20 1.00 2.17 0.46 1.00 0.94 0.41 1.00 0.35 0.94100 1.00 2.00 0.51 1.00 0.88 0.43 1.00 0.23 0.99
Table 5. Success probability Psuc, average distortion D, and success rate Pupp under adversarial training with PGD as the reference attack,
following [23] for MNIST and CIFAR10; and ensemble adversarial training [34] for ImageNet. Pupp measured at Dupp = 2 for MNIST,
0.7 for CIFAR10, and 1 for ImageNet.
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Figure 8. Operating characteristics of attacks against robust models: adversarial training with PGD as the reference attack [23] for MNIST
and CIFAR10, and ensemble adversarial training [34] for ImageNet. The number of iterations is 5 × 20 for C&W and 100 for I-FGSM,
PGD2, DDN and our BP.
original image FGSM: I-FGSM: PGD2: C&W: DDN: BP:
D=6.08 D= 5.05 D= 3.23 D=1.74 D=2.11 D=1.00
D=6.08 D= 4.97 D= 3.23 D=1.84 D=2.02 D=0.86
D=6.07 D= 5.01 D= 3.24 D=2.04 D=1.45 D=0.82
D=6.09 D= 4.98 D= 3.24 D=2.45 D=1.75 D=0.82
D=6.04 D= 5.00 D= 3.22 D=1.82 D=1.67 D=0.81
Figure 9. Original (left), adversarial (top row) and scaled perturbation (below) images against InceptionV3 on ImageNet. The five images
are the worst 5 images for BP requiring the strongest distortions, yet these are smaller than the distortions necessary with all other methods
(The red color means that the forged image is not adversarial). Perturbations are inverted (low is white; high is colored, per channel) and
scaled in the same way for a fair comparison.
